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4.1  Introduction 
Unemployment among black teenagers has reached astounding pro- 
portions.  Half  of  all  black  teenagers  who are out of  school report 
themselves as looking for work but unable to find it. Another group of 
almost equal size say that they are neither working nor looking for 
work. Just 40 percent of the out-of-school black youths in this country 
have a job-any  job. To  many observers, the ghetto is the first place 
to look for an explanation. Even the most casual glance at the poorer 
sections of the nation’s central cities reveals their weak economic con- 
dition.  It  seems quite plausible that black  teenagers are trapped  in 
blighted neighborhoods  where  the blue-collar, retailing,  and service 
jobs that teenagers can perform have largely vanished. The result may 
be unemployment, frustration, and alienation. 
This paper explores the so-called spatial mismatch hypothesis as an 
explanation for the poor labor market experiences of young blacks. At 
the core of the mismatch story is the spatial expansion of the American 
industrial cities. Wealthy families seeking less congestion, better ser- 
vices, safer neighborhoods, and a wide array of other amenities have 
fled the central cities, leaving behind the poor, the old, and the mi- 
norities. Industry, particularly manufacturing and retail trade, has been 
drawn outward by similar desires: cheaper land, better transportation 
networks, superior environments, wealthier customers, and to some 
extent, more skilled workers. What remain in the city are high-skilled 
white-collar jobs and low-skilled blue-collar workers. The fear is that 
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the outflow of  people and firms has left those least able to find and 
commute to employment trapped far away from the areas where new 
jobs are opening. In short, the young, black, urban poor struggle in a 
weak secondary labor market. 
There are many formulations of the mismatch hypothesis. Often the 
formulation is influenced by its author’s desired policy prescription. In 
this paper  I hope  to test whether  spatially  rearranging jobs in one 
metropolitan area would significantly improve the employment pros- 
pects of  black teenagers.  Logically, the question could be  asked in 
reverse:  would rearranging the residences of  black teenagers in the 
metropolitan area improve their prospects? The problem with the latter 
formulation is that it would require a large number of changes. Ghetto 
dispersal would not only change employment accessibility, but it would 
also alter the social and educational environment of black teenagers. 
Job rearrangement would have some of these effects, but nothing like 
massive desegregation. 
It is also important to realize that the story being tested here assumes 
that aggregate demand in the metropolitan  area is fixed. The hypo- 
thetical experiment is not one in which new jobs are created in the 
ghetto. That policy would have two components: Aggregate demand 
in the city is increased, and the spatial distribution of employment is 
altered. I want to test only the effects of  the latter change. The ex- 
periment is therefore one in which jobs are taken from one neighbor- 
hood and placed into another. It should be clear that whether or not 
the mismatch hypothesis proves to be valid, aggregate demand can 
affect teenage labor market performance. 
This paper begins by summarizing a theoretical model that explores 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for the labor market outcomes 
of otherwise identical individuals to differ depending on their residential 
location within a metropolitan area. The methodological insight offered 
by the model is that by observing the behavior of existing workers, 
along with the general movement of population and industry, we can 
determine which groups and  neighborhoods  are spatially  disadvan- 
taged.  The paper  then  explores in  detail the labor market  and job 
patterns in one metropolitan  area-Chicago.  Finally, this  study  ex- 
plored in detail. 
The paper shows that: 
*Low skilled jobs have been leaving the city faster than low skilled 
workers. As a result there are now more low skilled city residents 
who work in the suburbs than vice versa. 
*Young and low skilled blacks in Chicago spend far more time getting 
to work on the average than comparable whites. 
*Most workers, even young workers, work far outside any area that 
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Blacks are being gradually disadvantaged by job movements in Chi- 
cago. At the same time the fact that most workers labor far away from 
home hints at a more fluid labor market than might be envisioned by 
a mismatch theory. 
This study will explore the possible labor market effects of differ- 
ences in local job accessibility by examining the relationship between 
job proximity and labor market outcomes in Chicago’s neighborhoods. 
The  concluding  section  outlines  the  study’s findings.  The  findings 
include: 
*No measure of  accessibility proves to have any predictive power 
in employment equations for young people. Blac  Wwhite differences 
are wholly unaffected by their inclusion. 
*When we allow for fixed neighborhood effects of any type, we still 
have no impact on this racial differential. Indeed, the data does not 
reject the hypothesis of their being no spatial neighborhood effects 
for employment at all! 
*Labor market outcomes for young blacks on the West Side ghetto 
are remarkably similar to outcomes for those on the South Side, in 
spite of the dramatic differences in proximity to jobs. 
*Black and white teenagers who live in the same neighborhood fare 
just as differently as blacks and whites who live across town from 
each other! 
Thus we simultaneously understand the appeal of  mismatch model 
and its failure. Blacks really are being gradually disadvantaged by job 
movements. However, the labor market is wide enough geographically 
and fluid enough that at least by  1970, neighborhood job movements 
could not be blamed for much of the poor performance of  minorities 
in Chicago. Most teenagers, black and white, don’t work in their neigh- 
borhoods. And in black areas where there are many jobs for youth, 
white youngsters tend to fill them. 
This work does show that poverty and education have a very strong 
influence on black teenage unemployment  rates, just as they do for 
whites.  Efforts should continue to focus on these  problems.  Large 
differences remain,  however, in the outcomes of  measurably similar 
blacks and whites. Neighborhood job proximity does not seem to ac- 
count for much of these differences, at  least in  Chicago.  Race, not 
space, remains the key explanatory variable. 
4.2  Previous Literature 
In 1968, Kain published a very influential paper in which he advanced 
and sought to test a “mismatch hypothesis.” The author argued that 
housing market segregation “( 1) affects the distribution of Negro em- 
ployment, and (2) reduces Negro job opportunities, and  (3) postwar 150  David T. Ellwood 
suburbanization has seriously aggravated the problem.” He conjectured 
numerous links between the housing market and the labor market, links 
that included not only the direct effects of job accessibility, but also 
the influence that neighborhood characteristics might have on an em- 
ployer’s willingness to hire blacks. Employers with more contact and 
experience with blacks are presumably  more disposed toward hiring 
them. 
In his empirical work, Kain posited that there would be substantially 
more employment for blacks in Chicago and Detroit if  neighborhoods 
were desegregated. That work has since come under close scrutiny. 
Kain’s analysis clearly demonstrated that the spatial distributions of 
black employment and black residences were similar, confirming his 
first proposition.  But his conclusion that black employment opportu- 
nities were therefore reduced hinged critically on his functional-form 
assumptions (Offner and Saks 1971). Indeed, there is something trou- 
blirlg about a model that predicts more employment for black workers 
when the number of workers used in generating the prediction is un- 
changed. Thus, although Kain’s pathfinding work surfaced a number 
of tantalizing hypotheses, it left their validity largely unresolved. 
Many other authors have attempted to test the mismatch hypothesis. 
Mooney (1969) found that nonwhite unemployment rates in different 
SMSAs were correlated with the percentage of area employment that 
was in the city and the extent of reverse commuting. But the percentage 
of all employment in the city would be as much affected by where the 
boundaries of the city were drawn as by economic forces, so that it is 
difficult to understand why these variables should have any predictive 
power. On the other side, Masters (1974) found that segregation indices 
did not  help predict black  unemployment  rates in  cities.’  Although 
interesting, this result failed to test the mismatch hypothesis. A com- 
bination of segregation and job movement is what causes the employ- 
ment problem, not merely the degree of segregation. 
Most vehement in his attacks on the mismatch hypothesis has been 
Harrison.2 This author has collected a variety of data that he believes 
show that suburbanization of  employment has not increased in recent 
years. He has suggested that the flight of whites from the cities may 
even have left blacks in a stronger position for the central city jobs. 
Moreover, he has noted that blacks living outside the central city have 
incomes no higher than blacks living within the city but outside the 
poverty areas. This last result is difficult to interpret because Harrison 
explicitly selected nonpoor city blacks to compare with their suburban 
counterparts. 
Kalachic and Goering (1970) and Danziger and Weinstein (1976) found 
little evidence of a wage differential between ghetto and nonghetto jobs 
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entials in another city. And many other authors have looked at one or 
another aspect of these issues. 
Because this patchwork of  evidence was often derived without a 
strong theoretical base, it remains difficult to assess the validity of the 
mismatch hypothesis. Comparison between cities is dangerous, since 
each has its own history and since jurisdictional boundaries are largely 
arbitrary. The hypothesis is distinctly neighborhood-based.  It implies 
differences in labor market outcomes depending on the neighborhood 
a given worker inhabits. The strategy of this paper is therefore to take 
that distinctly neighborhood approach in one city: Chicago. I seek to 
explore in detail the spatial character of the labor market, with a par- 
ticular focus on teenagers. I am interested in the location of jobs and 
workers and changes in both over time. The complexity of even one 
city is almost sufficient to frustrate a comprehensive treatment of the 
labor market. Residential and industrial locations often reflect accidents 
of history as much as the workings of narrow economic forces. 
4.3  Summary of a Theoretical Formulation of the Mismatch Hypothesis 
In a previous paper (1981) I explored a model of the spatial mismatch 
between workers and jobs. Actually, the mismatch story turns most 
urban models on their heads. Normally in these models mobile workers 
choose their residences with an eye toward the location of their jobs, 
which are typically fixed in space. According to the mismatch story, 
some potential workers cannot move when the jobs they might fill move 
away. Because there is not space to detail the theoretical model in this 
paper, I shall present only its key features. The model described here 
can be characterized as an international trade model with a twist: People 
can commute between zones at a cost. Urban space is divided into a 
series of neighborhoods. Within each neighborhood housing prices and 
factor costs and rewards are identical. 
Workers’ utility is influenced by the housing prices in the neighbor- 
hood in which they live, the wage rate in the neighborhood in which 
they work, and a measure of the transportation  (or search) cost as- 
sociated with the workers’ commute. 
In the simplest form of the model, we assume there are two output 
sectors. The price of  each good is uniform across all neighborhoods. 
Each sector employs labor, land, and capital. Capital costs are assumed 
uniform and constant across zones. Wages and industrial land rents 
are free to vary between zones. Finally, zones may differ in efficiency 
of production. (Crime, distribution, or parking costs may be higher in 
certain neighborhoods.) 
Unemployment is not explicitly modeled in this general equilibrium 
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idence on labor market outcomes. The mismatch theory implies that 
labor market opportunities will differ among persons in different neigh- 
borhoods. We  could just as easily model this relationship as very low 
wages (or wages net of transport costs) in some zones relative to others. 
And if we impose some wage rigidities in areas where equilibrium wages 
are low, we could instead have high wages and high unemployment. 
In the context of this model, three forces will tend to equalize labor 
market opportunities across neighborhoods:  the movement of people 
to new residences; the movement of capital or firms between neigh- 
borhoods; and the commuting of workers between zones. Thus, three 
conditions must be met for a mismatch hypothesis to have force:  __ 
Residential location decisions must be constrained. Free mobility 
of residences would equalize the utility of identical workers. 
Conditions for business must be unfavorable due to either an ex- 
cessive cost of production or  a “shortage” of land in the same areas 
where residences are constrained. As a result, wage rates are low 
or else business leaves (or never enters) and few jobs are found in 
the neighborhood. 
Commuting or search costs must be nontrivial for jobs outside the 
neighborhood. Otherwise, workers forced to live in undesirable areas 
would simply commute to jobs in other neighborhoods. 
Because the results of these conditions are for the most part obvious, 
they receive only passing discussion here. 
One confusion that easily arises in the mismatch hypothesis is the 
difference between labor market outcomes and utilities. The mismatch 
story could be construed to indicate that labor market outcomes will 
differ depending on residential location, whether or not utilities differ. 
Variables other than labor market outcomes enter the utility function. 
Areas with  weak  labor market opportunities may  provide  offsetting 
advantages. Indeed, if we consider  job locations and wage rates to be 
exogenous, this model largely mimics the traditional Alonso (1964) and 
Kain (1962) models, in  which land rents decline with  distance from 
employment centers. Clearly, mismatch theorists have in mind labor 
market problems  serious enough to create insufficient compensating 
advantages in housing markets. If that is the case, the mobility of the 
disadvantaged  workers must be limited. Note, however, that a result 
showing differing labor market opportunities  by neighborhood need not 
indicate any market failures. We  should naturally expect some differ- 
ences. But if  people voluntarily choose to live in economically weak 
neighborhoods,  we can be sure that there are offsetting benefits.  It 
might  still  be interesting  to explore the differences  in  labor market 
opportunities even if  no limits were imposed on mobility, but utility 
variations can occur only when such limits exist. 
Thus, at the very heart of the mismatch  story are constraints on 
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pothesis argue that the residential  choices of blacks are particularly 
constrained because of discrimination in urban housing markets, and 
this point arouses little dispute. I know of no author who has argued 
that residential choices for blacks in Chicago are unconstrained, though 
considerable disagreement  persists  about whether  these  constraints 
lead to unusually high housing COS~S.~  Among teenagers, the problem 
of mobilty leading to identical utilities even if  labor market opportu- 
nities differ by location may not be serious anyway. Over 90 percent 
of all teenagers live at home. They have little option about their home- 
sites. Whatever the advantages or disadvantages of the particular home- 
site the parents have found, they surely will not exactly offset any job 
accessibility differences faced by teenagers. 
The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, our attention will be on 
the narrow question of whether identical individuals achieve “vastly” 
different labor market outcomes because of their residential location. 
We  cannot pretend to be able to distinguish completely any offsetting 
features in other markets. If large differences in labor market outcomes 
are found, it will be important to consider separately the possibility of 
a utility difference. 
Assuming residences are constrained, we must then consider under 
what  conditions labor market outcomes will  differ widely by neigh- 
borhood of residence. It is still quite plausible that mobility of  firms 
will cause equalization of opportunity. There will naturally be pressure 
for the production sector to move in such a way as to equalize access 
to labor and wages. The geographic labor market that fails to achieve 
such equality must suffer from at least two other important distortions. 
First, the conditions for factor price  equalization  must  not  be  met. 
Second, commuting and search costs must be nontrivial. 
The best-known theorem in international trade states quite simply 
that if  certain conditions are met, factor prices in all countries will be 
identical. By extension, if these assumptions are met in labor markets, 
wage  rates (and thus opportunities) will  not  differ across neighbor- 
hoods. In a two-sector model the most important assumptions are that 
all neighborhoods allow for equally efficient production and that both 
goods be produced in each zone.4 
In our model there are two particularly pertinent cases in which the 
theorem  may break down. If  efficiency does differ depending on lo- 
cation, the theorem fails. Or if  one or another zone has a superabun- 
dance of labor relative to land or vice versa, equalization will again be 
thwarted.  The first condition  is obvious. If  it  is more  expensive to 
produce one or another product in certain locations, either factor prices 
must fall or production simply will not take place there. There is no a 
priori reason  to believe that higher production costs will lead to de- 
creases only in  wage rates or  only in  land prices. Indeed, there are 
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we can predict downward pressure on both land prices and wages. The 
lower limit on both prices naturally depends on the opportunity costs 
of the factors. If workers have strong opportunities in nearby neigh- 
borhoods, the wage cannot fall below the net wage received by the 
commuters. If land has other uses such as housing or speculation, the 
fall in rents will also be limited. Quite plainly, it is possible that pro- 
duction inefficiencies and opportunity costs of factors may be such that 
no production will occur in some areas. 
Yet  even if  all areas allow for equally efficient production, where 
labor is very abundant in some neighborhoods relative to land or vice 
versa, the theorem may again fail. We  noted earlier that the factor price 
theorem works only when production takes place in both sectors in a 
neighborhood. At the equalized factor prices, each sector will use a 
particular combination of land and labor. Equilibrium requires that all 
factors be exhausted. Thus, some combination of production of  good 
X and good Y  must allow for full use of resources. So long as the 
overall land-labor ratio in the zone falls between that implied by the 
equalized wage-land rental ratio for production of goods X and Y,  we 
have no problem. That is, if  our zone has three workers per acre of 
industrial land and good X uses four workers per acre while good Y 
requires two workers per acre, then by using half  our land for the 
production of X and half for Y we will absorb all of the workers. 
But should a zone have a land-labor  ratio outside the bounds  of 
production for X and Y, there is a problem. A zone with five workers 
per acre cannot produce both X and Y.  When labor is too abundant, 
wages must fall and production (if it takes place at all) will be confined 
to the labor-intensive sector. There is nothing mystical here. When land 
is very scarce relative to labor, it is quickly used up. Prices for land 
rise and wage rates must fall or local employers cannot compete. Once 
again opportunity costs place a floor on the fall in factor prices. Wage 
rates therefore may not fall .sufficiently in neighborhoods  with large 
concentrations of labor to accommodate all nearby workers, and many 
residents may be forced to commute to other neighborhoods for work. 
Equilibrium is achieved when the net wage of all residents is iden- 
tical. Those who work nearby command less gross pay, but local em- 
ployers must pay more for land so they make no excess profit. Those 
workers who commute receive larger paychecks but bear search and 
commuting costs. Either way, if  efficiency differs by neighborhood or 
if  there are very large differences in the ratio of  land to labor across 
zones, factor prices and thus opportunities are likely to differ. 
The final condition for differential labor market outcomes for iden- 
tical residents of different neighborhoods is nontrivial commuting or 
search costs. We  explicitly allow workers to search for and commute 
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small relative to the wage, the net effect of neighborhood differences 
will also be small. These search and commuting costs limit the differ- 
ences in opportunity across neighborhoods. In the extreme when such 
costs are trivial, all persons face equal labor market opportunities. 
Everyone in the entire metropolitan area would be attracted to any job 
paying a little extra. Ultimately, it is this condition that we must explore 
most closely. Proximity to work does vary dramatically by neighbor- 
hood. But if such variations are important to consider when exploring 
the labor market outcomes of  young people, search and commuting 
costs must be very high. 
Let me summarize the conditions that must be met for a plausible 
mismatch theory.  First, there must be constraints on the residential 
location decisions of workers. This condition is not essential for labor 
market opportunities to differ by neighborhood, but it is critical for 
utility levels to differ by neighborhood. Second, either neighborhoods 
must vary in their productive efficiency or some zones must have an 
overabundance  of  labor or  land, or both; otherwise, wages will  be 
everywhere identical. Finally, commuting costs must be nontrivial. 
It can be argued very effectively that the first two conditions are met 
for ghetto youths. The residential choices of these youths’ parents are 
obviously  constrained.  Moreover, the young people  themselves  are 
essentially constrained to live at home. It also appears that production 
is less efficient in the ghetto and even that usable land for industry is 
relatively scarce. 
Production costs might be higher in the ghetto for many reasons. 
Theft and vandalism are unusually high. No11  (1970) argues that busi- 
ness expansion in ghetto areas is difficult because the acquisition of 
space is complicated by the need to buy land from several owners, 
each of  whom potentially  occupies a monopolistic position.  Hamer 
(1972) reports that demolition costs are high relative to the acquisition 
costs of unfettered land in the suburbs. Kain (1968) points to a reluc- 
tance of skilled workers, who tend to be white, to work in undesirable 
areas. Parking is always a problem. Finally, a congested and outmoded 
transportation network often hampers the movement of goods to na- 
tional markets. 
There is good reason to suppose that usable land may  be hard to 
find  in  the  ghetto.  The arguments of  No11  and  Hamer noted above 
suggest not only that production is costly, but also that usable land is 
limited. Population densities in urban ghettos are typically the highest 
of any area in the SMSA. The labor-land ratio in the ghetto is obviously 
many times greater than that in the  suburb^.^ 
The key question, then, is whether search and commuting costs for 
young people in the inner city are costly. And certainly, such a scenario 
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available  to poor young blacks, and the mass transportation system 
may  not  serve them well.  Youths may  value their leisure time very 
highly, implying a greater cost (relative to the wage) of commuting time 
than adults. An even more plausible story is one that emphasizes the 
high cost of initial job search outside the neighborhood.  Youngsters 
may be unfamiliar with the transportation system they need to use to 
locate a job in  the first  place.  Others may  genuinely fear for their 
personal  safety  once they  leave  the familiar  areas near home.  It is 
widely claimed that young blacks simply will not set foot in some alien 
neighborhoods.  Finally, the job-search process of teenagers may rely 
heavily  on informal networks, which  may dissipate with  distance. I 
shall explore these issues in some detail later in this paper. Suffice it 
to say, however,  it is quite plausible  that commuting may impose a 
serious burden on many youngsters seeking work. 
If  the three conditions for our model are met in the ghetto, we can 
make three principal predictions. 
HYPOTHESIS  1. There will be downward pressure on wage rates in 
Whether ghetto production is less efficient or usable land is simply 
scarce, there will be downward pressure on wages. (For land prices, 
pressure will be downward if the area is less efficient and upward when 
land is scarce.) But wages may be constrained by the standard litany 
of rigidity-inducing institutions.  The minimum wage, unions, govern- 
ment payment rules all serve to prop up wages.  Firms with  several 
plants in the region are rarely willing to offer lower wages at one or 
another plant. Discrimintion laws may also deter a company from of- 
fering lower wages in ghetto plants. As a result wages may not adjust 
downward sufficiently to provide jobs to all who seek them. Unem- 
ployment would be the inevitable result. 
the ghetto. 
HYFQTHESIS  2. Ghettojrms will tend to be labor intensive. 
The plentiful resource in a neighborhood with a depressed market is 
labor. The firms most likely to offset added costs of business in the 
ghetto are ones that can exploit this resource. The result will be more 
than just the obvious one that firms needing low-skilled labor will be 
drawn to the ghetto. This result follows from the surplus of labor in 
the ghetto and not from the low skills of ghetto residents. Even if all 
workers in metropolitan areas were identical, ghetto production-if  it 
exists-would  likely to be labor intensive. 
HYFQTHESIS  3. The ghetto will tend to export labor to other neigh- 
borhoods. Workers living in the ghetto will tend to travel farther 
to work than their counterparts in other metropolitan areas. 
If opportunities are more limited in the ghetto, workers will try to 
commute to  jobs elsewhere. The greater the differential in wage rates 
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the opportunities in one area, the farther the marginal worker will travel 
for work. This result is obvious, but very important methodologically. 
It suggests a way of measuring accessibility by observing the journey- 
to-work patterns of workers. Neighborhoods with low job accessibility 
will tend to export workers. Those workers will travel farther to work 
than their counterparts in other areas. 
This model illustrates the appeal of a simple mismatch story. It can 
generate low wages and skewed occupational distributions without re- 
sorting to models of discrimination or of the heterogeneity of workers. 
Unlike discrimination models, this formulation of the mismatch story 
requires  no noncompetitive  behavior on the part of firms.  No large 
profits are forgone.  The cost of  business  operation is  higher  in the 
ghetto or land is scarce, and ghetto residents suffer. Indeed, the two- 
sector formulation of the model used here is in most important respects 
similar to Becker’s use of a one-sector model in his landmark book 
(1957) on discrimination. That similar results are generated here should 
be no surprise. 
Of  course, discrimination is  not ruled  out in  this  model.  Indeed, 
housing market discrimination is crucial to its formulation. Discrimi- 
nation  in the labor market could  serve to exacerbate the mismatch 
problems. The reluctance of capital to flow into the ghetto could reflect 
ill feelings towards blacks rather than high real costs. If firms in or out 
of the ghetto refuse to hire blacks, “search costs” may indeed be high. 
The appeal of the model, however, is part of the reason it is so hard 
to test. Low wages, skewed occupational distributions, and high un- 
employment can be generated by mismatch, by discrimination, and by 
differences among workers. The difficult task is to distinguish among 
these. 
What is unique about the mismatch model is its emphasis on em- 
ployment location. In theory, ghetto firms will pay less than nonghetto 
firms. Those willing to commute out can command higher wages. The 
occupational mix of ghetto and nonghetto firms will be different. But 
the heterogeneity of firms and workers bedevils easy empirical testing. 
The strongest  result is perhaps the most  obvious:  Persons living in 
neighborhoods with weak local employment opportunities will tend to 
commute to other neighborhoods.  If  that commuting imposes heavy 
costs-either in initial job search or in daily commuting-persons  living 
in these areas will fare worse in the labor market. 
The basic insight, then, is to observe the behavior of existing workers 
to determine the neighborhood’s proximity to  jobs. The methodology 
used here is to relate neighborhood employment rates to various mea- 
sures of job proximity based on the behavior of existing workers. Even 
here we must be very careful. Worker commuting patterns differ for 
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4.4  Worksites,  Homesites, and Commuting in Chicago 
The theoretical model outlined above suggests that we ought to look 
at workers’ differential residential  and workplace  locations and the 
commuting behavior  these imply  in  our  search for evidence for or 
against the mismatch hypothesis. We  need to define a variety of prox- 
imity measures and to relate these to labor market outcomes in the 
neighborhoods in and around Chicago. Before embarking on that task, 
it is enlightening to consider briefly the broad employment, residence, 
and commuting patterns observed in Chicago. 
During the  1960s the central city of  Chicago experienced declines 
relative to the surrounding suburbs in both the number of jobs located 
there and in the number of workers living there. The city actually lost 
more jobs than working residents. In 1960 the city housed 59 percent 
of all workers in the Chicago (SMSA) and it held nearly 69 percent of 
all jobs. But by 1970, the figures had fallen to 48 percent and 53 percent, 
respectively.  Thus, by  1970 the image of  a central city that held the 
jobs for “bedroom”  suburbs no longer applied to Chicago. Jobs and 
workers had achieved rough parity. 
Of  course overall parity did not translate into identical patterns of 
work and home locations for all occupations. Table 4.1, drawn from 
census data, reveals  the changing workplace and residence patterns 
by  occupation  between  1960 and  1970. The table  records  both  the 
percentage of all those employed in each occupation who lived in the 
city (rather than the suburbs) and the percentage who worked there. 
It  also reports the  ratio  of  these two, labeled  the  import ratio.  In 
effect, the import ratio gives the ratio of jobs to workers in the city. 
If  equal numbers of persons lived and worked there, the ratio would 
equal one. An  import  ratio of  one does not  of  course indicate that 
there is no commuting, only that as many workers commute out of 
the city each day as commute into it. Since there are more professional 
jobs located in  the city than there are professionals  living there, on 
net the city imports professionals from the suburbs each day and the 
import ratio for that occupation exceeds one. By contrast, there are 
actually fewer city jobs for laborers than there are resident laborers, 
so each day the city is a net exporter of  these workers and the ratio 
falls below one. 
As we would expect, the city is a major net importer of professional, 
managerial, and sales personnel. What is somewhat surprising is the 
fact that Chicago is actually a net exporter of all of lower-skilled oc- 
cupations. More operatives, laborers, and service workers live in the 
city than work there. Even more striking is the fact that the deterio- 
ration in the import ratios between 1960 and 1970 was greatest in those 
occupations. So although declines came in all workplace and residence 159  The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis 
Table 4.1  Worksites, Residences, and Central City Import Ratios for AU 
Employed Persons, by  Occupation, 1960 and 1970 
% of All Persons 
Employed in Occupation  Employed in Occupation  Import 
Living in the City  Working in the City  Ratio 
% of All Persons 











































































Source:  1960 and 1970 census data. 
categories, the city’s biggest losses were in the residences of highly 
skilled, well-paid workers and in jobs for its low-skilled residents. 
One portion of the mismatch hypothesis does appear to be verified, 
therefore, in Chicago.  Low-skilled jobs are leaving faster than low- 
skilled workers, and those workers remaining in the city may be dis- 
advantaged. This is particularly plausible for blacks, since roughly 90 
percent of them do in fact live in the city and since as a group, they 
are disproportionately low-skilled. Indeed, other data do show that 
commuting patterns are quite different between blacks and whites. And 
low-skilled blacks do travel farther to work than low-skilled whites. 
Table 4.2  is based  on a special survey conducted by  the Chicago 
Area Transportation Study (CATS) in 1970.6  In general, urban theorists 
hypothesize that desires for land and other environmental amenities 
lead wealthier persons to live farther from the city (and their jobs) than 
those with more modest incomes. Thus, we should expect to see higher- 
paid  professionals and managers  commuting farther than lower-paid 
operatives and laborers. Interestingly enough, that is exactly the pat- 160  David T.  Ellwood 
tern we can observe for whites in Chicago. White managers and profes- 
sionals are slightly more likely to work in  the city than  are whites 
working in lesser-skilled occupations. But they are much more likely 
to live in the suburbs. As a result they average 35-minute commutes 
each way whereas white laborers and service workers travel 25 minutes 
on average. The bulk of the variation in travel times seems to be caused 
by differences in where the members of  particular occupations live, 
rather than in where they work. 
By contrast, most of the variation in the journey-to-work times of 
blacks is almost entirely the result of differences in where they work. 
Roughly 90 percent of the workers in each occupation live in the city. 
But in the lower-skilled categories a sizable fraction work outside the 
city. As a result commuting times are actually slightly longer among 
these lower-skilled blacks. And they are considerably longer than the 
times for comparable whites. Low-skilled blacks spend as much time 
commuting as professional whites. 
These findings are supported by yet another source: the 1975 Annual 
Housing Survey (AHS) for Chicago. This survey is richer in demo- 
graphic detail than CATS, but it is weaker in occupational information. 
Table 4.3 is drawn from the AHS data. Once again we see that lower- 
Table 4.2  Residence and Workplace Location Patterns, Import Ratios, and 
Travel Times for White and Black Workers, by  Occupation, 1970 
Average 
% Living in  % Working in  Import  Travel 



















































































Source: Calculated from 1970 Chicago Area Transportation Survey data. 161  The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis 
skilled whites  travel  shorter distances  and have  shorter commuting 
times than higher-skilled whites. Perhaps most relevant for this study 
is the finding that white teenagers have very short travel times, aver- 
aging only  15 minutes.  And again the pattern for blacks is quite dif- 
ferent. In the lowest-skilled categories, travel times and distances are 
much longer for blacks than for whites. Most dramatically, black teen- 
agers travel much farther to work and spend much longer traveling, 
according to this survey. Indeed, black teenage men spend more than 
double the time commuting of their white counterparts, on average. 
We should also keep in mind that these are average and not marginal 
travel times. They represent the average experience of those who re- 
ceived jobs. In other words, they do not necessarily reflect the com- 
muting that would be required of the next potential worker. If nearby 
jobs are easier to find and are filled first, excess commuting times for 
the marginal black teenager could in fact be much greater. Even the 
average figures reported in the AHS imply that in a five-day workweek, 
black teens spend two and one-half more hours in  transit than white 
teens. 
This glimpse at the general patterns helps illustrate why the mismatch 
hypothesis holds real appeal to those interested  in  the  problems  of 
minorities. In Chicago, at least, low-skilled jobs are in fact moving out 
of  the city faster than low-skilled workers.  Blacks do spend longer 
getting to work than comparable whites.’ And the differences are most 
Table 4.3  Travel Times and Distances to Work  for Whites and Nonwhites in 
Chicago, 1975 
Average Time  Average Distance 
Whites  Nonwhites  Whites  Nonwhites 
All Ages 
Household Heads, 
Aged 30-39  with Education: 
Less than 12 Years 
12 Years 
Over 12 Years 
















33.0  9.9 
27.4  11.8 
33.1  13.5 
36.2  4.5 
Employed Women 
32.8  7.2 
36.1  7.3 
33.0  7.1 
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extreme for precisely those groups we might expect to have limited 
mobility and haphazard job-search methods-the  low-skilled and the 
young. Obviously, the hypothesis merits closer examination. 
Although black teens spend more than twice as long as whites trav- 
eling to work, the differences need not have a sizable impact on labor 
market outcomes nor do they necessarily explain a large portion of the 
racial  differences  in  labor  market  outcomes. The extra travel  time 
amounts to just 5 percent extra work time in an eight-hour day. Trans- 
portation economists report that commuting time is typically valued at 
roughly half the wage.8 If so, even an absurdly high labor-supply elas- 
ticity of, say, two would explain only five percentage points of the 50 
percent difference in the employment rates of black and white teens. 
Thus, we need a model that suggests youths who live farther from 
jobs suffer greater disadvantages than those imposed by higher com- 
muting costs. We  need a model whereby initial job search or job ac- 
quisition is severely hampered by geographic separation from jobs. If 
job-search costs rose, for example, exponentially with distance because 
of  initial transportation  costs, more limited information, or fear and 
uncertainty about neighborhoods farther from home, and if youths did 
not expect to stay in any particular job for an extended period, much 
more significant negative effects could result. 
A slight modification of this notion derives from the work of Rees 
and  Schultz (1970) in  the  early  1960s. They  found  that low-skilled 
workers tended to find jobs primarily through the use of informal net- 
work~.~  It does seem  plausible that  such networks would  dissipate 
proportionately with distance from home. Thus, these low-skilled black 
workers might be disadvantaged in their initial job search. 
There is a second aspect of these results  that casts doubt on the 
plausibility of the mismatch hypothesis. The mean distances and the 
variances around them are very large. A five-mile journey brings any 
teenager well outside almost any conception of neighborhood. Typical 
walking speed is roughly three miles per hour, and therefore jobs even 
for white youths are over one hour’s walk from home. It seems unlikely 
that youths would be very familiar with most of the areas within a five- 
mile radius. And the variances in travel times and distances are very 
large for all groups. It is not at all uncommon for the standard deviations 
to be two-thirds the size of the mean. Such a wide variance indicates 
a far more dynamic and wide-ranging labor market than some mismatch 
models might suggest. 
Nonetheless, it is still plausible that job accessibility differences are 
important. We must therefore turn to the question whether the observed 
differences in job accessibility do in fact explain differences in the labor 
market outcomes of whites  and blacks  and of residents  of different 
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4.5  Methodology 
In our methodological approach to the question of spatial mismatch, 
we are interested in two related issues. Does proximity to jobs influ- 
ence labor market outcomes? And if they do, can differences in prox- 
imity explain an important part of the racial differential in the outcomes 
for youth-particularly  employment outcomes? The natural method- 
ological approach is to define one or several measures of job acces- 
sibility and to examine their relationship to the employment and earn- 
ings of  blacks  and whites in  different areas of  the city. Yet  serious 
methodological problems  arise  when  one seeks to estimate  such a 
model.  The most  serious problems concern the development of  ap- 
propriate measures of  accessibility.  Even in simple models in which 
workers  and jobs  are all  identical,  the fact  that  wage  rates,  labor 
supply, in commuting patterns are all determined simultaneously makes 
it  difficult to select ex post a meaningful definition of  accessibility, 
particularly  if  we allow for rigidity in wages and for unemployment. 
When  the theoretical problems  are combined  with  a  rather  serious 
shortage of  individual data that provide both detailed geographic and 
socioeconomic information, the prospects for appropriate estimation 
are discouraging. 
Because of these problems, the approach taken in this paper is to 
use three different methods to examine the potential relationship be- 
tween employment and proximity. First, census tract employment rate 
equations will be estimated including one of  many different measures 
of  neighborhbod job proximity in each. Second, census tract employ- 
ment rate equations are estimated that allow for fixed neighborhood 
effects and that are designed to capture the impact of all unobserved 
neighborhood differences, including variations in job proximity. And 
third, natural experiments which occur within the city will be exploited 
by comparing the labor market outcomes of blacks who live in neigh- 
borhoods with vastly different job accessibilities and by comparing the 
outcomes of blacks and whites who live in the same neighborhoods. 
The first method is simply an attempt to operationalize the different 
models described above. A large number of neighborhood proximity 
measures drawn from several different data sources are defined and 
then used as independent variables in regression  models that use as 
the dependent  variable  the youth  employment rate in  a very  small 
district of the city of Chicago. 
The second method uses the same dependent variables but allows 
instead for separate intercepts for each of over 100 neighborhoods. In 
essence, this method controls for all neighborhood differences regard- 
less of their origin. Thus, the fixed effects capture the impact not only 
of proximity differences, but also of differences in local schools, in the 164  David T. Ellwood 
attitudes and tastes of local residents, and in anything else that varies 
over space. 
The final approach is quite different. There are two ghettos in Chi- 
cago: one is the city’s South Side and the other is the West Side. By 
every conceivable measure, blacks living in  the West Side live much 
closer to jobs than those in the South. Just after the 1970 Census was 
completed, the Census Bureau conducted a series of Census Employ- 
ment Surveys (CES) in low-income areas across the United States, for 
which  the agency  collected  detailed  labor information  on relatively 
large samples of individuals. Two of those surveys were conducted in 
Chicag-fortunately,  for our purposes, one in each of the ghettos. We 
can therefore exploit the natural experiment by comparing persons in 
these two areas in  some detail  and  then  explore the effects  of job 
proximity on young blacks’ employment experience. 
We can also use these same CES data for another natural experiment. 
The West  Side is actually  a collection of several low-income neigh- 
borhoods, some black and some white. Thus, we can compare the labor 
market outcomes of blacks and whites living very close to each other. 
This second natural experiment allows us to examine the extent to 
which  differential  outcomes between blacks  and  whites  can be ex- 
plained by differences in proximity. If they can, blacks and whites will 
fare much more similarly in areas where they live close to each other. 
The results of all these tests are remarkably strong and consistent. 
At best, proximity has a marginal impact on labor market outcomes- 
about as much as we might  expect from the reduced real wage that 
results from commuting slightly farther to  jobs. There is little evidence 
that spatial differences in job accessibility are a major explanation of 
the poor labor market outcomes of young blacks. 
Let us begin, then, with a discussion of the methods used to examine 
the impact of various job proximity measures on employment rates. 
4.5.1  Proximity and Employment 
We  might  have  considered  the impact of  accessibility  on a  wide 
variety of labor market outcomes, including employment status, wage 
rates, occupational attainment, and school enrollment. Ideally, we might 
like to use individual  data on accessibility  and other neighborhood 
variables in equations estimating labor supply, unemployment, wages, 
or schooling. Unfortunately, individual data with both detailed spatial 
identification and high-quality labor market performance measures do 
not exist. But using 1970 census tract data, we can relate employment 
rates  for  out-of-school  youths  in  each  tract  to  our  measures  of 
accessibility. 
There are some 1,600 census tracts in Chicago. A series of weighted 
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models the employment rate for out-of-school youths aged 16 to  21 living 
in the tract-labeled  EMRATE-served  as the dependent variable. This 
variable, along with the bulk of the independent variables, was culled 
from 1970 census tract data. The youth employment rate is available for 
both men and women. The regression results reported here are for both 
sexes to reduce the measurement error of the dependent variable. All 
have also been run separately by gender, yielding essentially similar re- 
sults for the two sexes except where noted in the text. 
The most critical independent variables were those designed to cap- 
ture the proximity of jobs to the tract and the measure of racial com- 
position there. We  are looking for two types of results. First, a strong 
performance by the accessibility measures would offer support for the 
mismatch hypothesis. And if  the inclusion of proximity measures re- 
duces the measured coefficient on race, we will have explained a portion 
of the racial differential. 
The proximity measures are drawn from several different sources 
and are discussed in section 4.5.2.  The remaining independent variables 
were derived from census data. PBLACK indicates the percentage of 
the population  who are black. PSPANZSH provides the comparable 
figure for those who are Spanish speaking. In addition  to the racial 
composition variables, a variety of human capital and socioeconomic 
variables were included. PSCHOOL is the proportion of persons aged 
16 to 21 who are in school and thus is a measure of the schooling level 
of the out-of-school group. The greater the value of  PSCHOOL, the 
later people leave school, and thus the older and better-educated are 
the out-of-school people. Two measures of economic well-being in the 
tract  are also included:  FAMZNC, the  average family  income; and 
PPOOR, the proportion of families living below the federal poverty 
level. The inclusion of two income measures obviously complicates 
the interpretation of each one separately. PUNDER25 indicates the 
percentage of the tract’s residents who are under 25 years of age and 
is designed to capture any demographic effects. PSZNG is the per- 
centage of children living in single-parent families. 
Sample sizes vary by tract, creating heteroskedasticity in the data. 
OLS estimates are unbiased but inefficient. Thus, all regressions were 
run weighted (by the square root of the sample size) and unweighted. 
Both procedures yielded virtually identical results, though weighting 
often improved precision. The weighted results are presented here. All 
statistical tests (including the Fischer test described in section 4.6.1) 
were appropriately adjusted to account for the weighting. 
4.5.2  Measuring Job Proximity 
Even the most casual local observer would recognize that there is 
enormous variability in job accessibility across the city and SMSA of 166  David T.  Ellwood 
Chicago. We  shall see, for example, that by every conceivable measure 
there is a concentration of jobs in and around the city’s West Side and 
there is a comparable void on the South Side. Yet finding meaningful 
ways to quantify those differences is a difficult task. 
For both practical and theoretical reasons, accessibility should not 
be measured separately for each census tract. Tracts are simply too 
small to serve as reasonable representations of neighborhood job mar- 
kets. And our limited data make it impossible to create different mea- 
sures for each tract. Instead, accessibility will be defined over “neigh- 
borhoods”-the  geographic concept that everyone understands but no 
one can define. In the 1940s, Chicago planners nonetheless accepted 
the task of defining zones that roughly corresponded to existing neigh- 
borhoods, and they created 76  “community  areas”  (or community 
zones). Since that time these zones have been used as basic geographic 
units for collecting and reporting data (and delivering services). Chicago 
census tracts have been chosen to be  simply subdivisions of  these 
community areas; thus, tracts can be easily aggregated to the larger 
zones. 
These community zones seemed the logical and easiest definition of 
neighborhoods within the city. In the remainder of the SMSA no such 
convenient zones have been designated. Still, census tracts or groups 
of tracts often conform to municipal boundaries that in most cases have 
real practical significance. In the areas outside the city, census tracts 
were combined in such a way as to create another 40 zones. The 116 
zones in and out of the city were used as neighborhoods. 
Obviously, no one measure of  accessibility can capture all aspects 
of proximity. For that reason, a variety are developed and considered 
here. Each captures a slightly different conception of accessibility, and 
each offers peculiar advantages and disadvantages. The three primary 
measures considered here are the following: the number of jobs within 
a 30-minute public transit distance from the neighborhood-either for 
all jobs or for particular types of jobs; the neighborhood import ratio, 
that is, the ratio of jobs to workers in the neighborhood-either for all 
occupations or for a selected subset; and the average journey-to-work 
travel time for workers living in the neighborhood-again,  either for 
all workers or for a particular subset. 
All three measures rely heavily on the CATS  data, which provide 
detailed geographical information on where each worker surveyed lives 
and works and the mode of transit taken. In addition, the CATS group 
developed a “SKIMTREE”  that indicates the length of time a com- 
muter can expect to spend in traveling between any two points in the 
SMSA if an automobile is used or if  public transit is used.  We  now 
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4.5.3  Number of Nearby Jobs 
An obvious measure of accessibility is simply the number of jobs 
nearby. Zones closer to more jobs would be more accessible. The time 
it takes to traverse a particular distance varies widely between any two 
points in the city; therefore, a count of jobs within 30 or 45 minutes’ 
travel time seems most appropriate. With SKIMTREE data on travel 
times for mass transit or automobile between any two points in the 
SMSA, it is feasible to combine the tree with data on workplace location 
to generate measures of the number of jobs within, say, a 30-minute 
rapid transit commute of any neighborhood. 
One serious problem with this sort of measure is that it counts only 
jobs and takes no account of the number of people who may be com- 
peting for those jobs. Ifjobs are plentiful nearby, but so are job seekers, 
those jobs cannot be considered readily available. Suburban workers 
fare poorly by this measure; low job densities and weak mass transit 
systems place  suburban residents far from most jobs. If  we  include 
auto transit in our measure, we see no better results. Suburban resi- 
dents still live close to fewer jobs. But the low population densities in 
suburban areas mean that even though there are fewer jobs nearby, 
they may be more readily available. Thus, an import ratio comparing 
jobs to workers in an area seems like a more appropriate measure. 
4.5.4  Neighborhood Import Ratio 
In a previous  section we compared, for various occupations,  the 
number of jobs in the central city to the number of workers living there. 
The ratio of jobs to working residents was labeled the import ratio. We 
found ratios far in excess of one for white-collar occupations, indicating 
that these workers descend en masse on the city from the suburbs each 
day. By contrast, the import ratio for blue-collar and service workers 
was less than one. These workers commute out of  the city for work. 
It seems logical to use the same concept on a smaller scale to measure 
job accessibility by neighborhood. We  can calculate import ratios for 
various types of jobs for each community zone using the CATS data. 
Neighborhoods with  more jobs than  workers  will  import  labor and 
exhibit an import ratio greater than one. Those with fewer jobs than 
workers will exhibit the reverse. 
Since our focus is on  teenagers,  we  ought  to concentrate on the 
relative proximity of those jobs most likely to be available to them. In 
principle, with sufficient data we could calculate import ratios for each 
neighborhood based only on teenage jobs and workers. In practice, the 
CATS data are too limited to allow such disaggregation with  much 
precision. Import ratios have also been calculated for two other types 168  David T.  Ellwood 
of jobs and workers: first, for all occupations: and second, for blue- 
collar and service occupations only. 
The problem with the import ratio is that it compares two stocks- 
workers and jobs-in  a neighborhood.  Yet  nearby jobs may not  be 
available to local workers. If jobs in an area are not growing, it could 
be argued that all existing matches between employees and employers 
may have already been established and that teenagers therefore cannot 
get local jobs. High turnover rates in manufacturing make this scenario 
unlikely, but it still deserves attention. Job growth is used as a measure 
of accessibility in this analysis, as discussed below. But an even more 
appropriate measure is the average travel time taken by existing work- 
ers in their journeys to work. 
4.5.5  Average Travel Time 
Ultimately, we seek information on the distance the marginal worker 
in any area must travel to find a particular job. Although we cannot 
calculate that distance for the marginal worker, we can for the average 
one. And if job turnover is high, the distinction between the average 
and the marginal may not be too serious. 
The travel-time measure is particularly appealing because it reflects 
actual worker behavior. If jobs are found nearby, travel time to work 
will be short. If particular workers cannot find  jobs in the neighborhood, 
their travel time will be long. The biggest measurement problems reflect 
the heterogeneity  of the labor force. Some workers permanently at- 
tached  to fheir firms may  move far from  their jobs in  a search for 
neighborhood amenities. Their long travel times will be included in the 
average, even though they could find otherjobs  near their homes. Their 
travel behavior therefore may not say much about marginal accessi- 
bility. If we confine our attention to blue-collar and service workers or 
even to youths, among whom turnover is common, the averages are 
likely to be more accurate measures of accessibility. 
4.5.6  Other Measures 
There is a plethora of other possible measures of job accessibility. 
Probably the strongest candidates are those that capture job growth or 
decline. Employing job growth alone as a measure of job availability 
is inappropriate. Most jobs for teenagers are not “new” jobs; turnover 
and promotion create most openings. More importantly, there is a se- 
rious simultaneity bias in any job-change measure. The lack of amen- 
ities characteristic of ghettos may  slowly induce firms to leave. Job 
decline may be the result of poverty rather than vice versa. Even when 
substantial employment remains, ghetto areas will look worst according 
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Nonetheless, a variety of job-change variables were also tested. None 
performed well at all. Thus, the actual measures used and the results 
obtained are not reported here. The other measures that were included 
in the analysis are shown below. All of them are defined for community 
zones  and were  derived using  1970 CATS  data on journey-to-work 
origins and distributions, in combination with a SKIMTREE indicating 
travel time, by means of  transit, between all points in the area. In the 
regressions, these are labeled: 
JOBSNEAR (ALL) = The proportion of all jobs in the SMSA that 
can be reached within 30 minutes of  the zone by public transit. 
JOBSNEAR (BCS) = The proportion of all blue-collar and service 
jobs than can be reached within 30 minutes of the zone by public 
transit. 
IMPORTRATIO (ALL) = The ratio of all jobs to all workers re- 
siding in the zone. 
IMPORTRATIO (BCS) = The ratio of blue-collar and service jobs 
to blue-collar and service workers residing in the zone. 
AVTIME (ALL) = The average travel time to work of all workers 
living in the zone. 
AVTIME (BCS) = The average travel time to work of blue-collar 
and service workers living in the zone. 
AVTZME (TEEN) = The average travel time to work of teenage 
workers living in the zone. 
The measures based on teenagers are included in spite of the fact that 
the limited sample  sizes subject the estimates to considerable mea- 
surement errof. The means and standard deviations of the variables 
used in the regressions are reported in table 4.4. 
4.6  Empirical Results 
4.6.1  Tract Employment Rates 
Table 4.5 displays the weighted regression results, first without any 
accessibility measure and then with several entered individually. These 
particular measures are based strictly on blue-collar and service work- 
ers. Generally, the coefficients on the other independent variables are 
very much what we might expect. Every variable performs exactly as 
we would expect. The three key variables-schooing,  race, and in- 
come-perform  very strongly. If we increase the proportion of young- 
sters in school in an area from 30 to 60 percent, holding fixed all other 
variables, the employment rate for out-of-school youths rises four to 
five percentage points because, on average, those youths have more 
education. Poverty also shows a powerful effect. A tract where half of 
the families are poor suffers employment rates almost ten points lower 170  David T.  Ellwood 
Table 4.4 
Variable  Mean  Standard  Deviation 
Means and Standard Deviations for Variables Used in Regressions 
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than one khere no poverty exists. If such tracts also have an average 
family income of $10,000 less, the difference rises to nearly  15 points. 
Yet  even after controlling for schooling, income, family composition, 
and age composition, race is the most significant variable. Tracts that 
are entirely black suffer employment rates 18 percentage points lower 
than  those  that  are all  white,  all  else  the same.  The coefficient on 
PBLACK is  18 times its standard error. Race is thus a powerful pre- 
dictor of employment status in Chicago in  1970. The black-white dif- 
ferential to be explained is sizable. 
In these results, neighborhoods with a large proportion of Spanish- 
speaking residents also fare poorly. The coefficient reported here is 78 
percent of the black one. Quite interestingly, this is one of the two 
coefficients that  are very different in the  all-male employment rate 
equation. (The results in table 4.5 are for both sexes.) The estimated 
coefficient drops from .13 in these regressions to .07 when we consider 
employment for men only. One other value changes dramatically: that 
for PSZNG, the percentage of children in single-parent families. This 
coefficient also fades in significance for men only. Presumably, some 
women are not in the labor force because of marriage or family re- Table 4.5  Regression Results from 1970 Census Tract Data 
Independent  Dependent Variable: EMRATE 












N  1,132  1,132  1,132  1,132 
Standard Error 
of Estimate  .094  ,094  ,094  ,094 
RZ  .642  ,642  ,644  ,644 
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sponsibilities. It seems plausible that regarding these two coefficients, 
the equations for all young people are capturing both differences in 
labor market opportunities in the tract and differences in other factors 
influencing labor market participants. 
Table 4.5 also plots the performance of  three of  the accessibility 
variables. JOBSNEAR(BCS) is the first. If the proportion of all blue- 
collar and service jobs within 30 minutes of the residence captures job 
proximity, the expected sign would be positive. Instead, we see a neg- 
ative one and the variable is completely insignificant. The failure of 
this measure was not unexpected, since it is a better measure of prox- 
imity in the city than outside it. 
IMPORTRATIO  has several advantages as a measure of neighbor- 
hood job availability. It compares jobs and workers, and it is a better 
indicator of job accessibility  in many  suburban zones than in  most 
central city ones. We  would  expect a positive sign; more jobs per 
worker should yield higher levels of employment. In fact, the coefficient 
is positive and just significant at conventional levels. But the coefficient 
is extremely small. If we could transform a neighborhood from having 
two workers per job to one having two  jobs per worker, the employment 
ratio would rise only one percentage point according  to these regressions! 
The average travel time for blue-collar residents of the neighborhood 
is also signed as expected and significant. Zones where workers spend 
more  time getting to work have lower rates of  employment among 
young people.  But here  again the measured effects are very  small. 
Reducing average travel time by two standard deviations (12 minutes) 
again would boost employment by only one percentage point. 
The small coefficients observed are consistent with a model in which 
extra commuting time lowers the real wage  somewhat and thereby 
causes a fall in labor supply. Suppose the labor supply elasticity were 
1.0 and travel time were valued at one-half the wage. A one-minute 
extra commuting time each way would then reduce the real wage by 
roughly 0.2 percent in an eight-hour day (2/480  x  50 percent). A 0.2 
percent  reduction in  EMRATE with a mean  of  .65 translates  into a 
decrease of .0013. This estimate is remarkably close to the coefficient 
estimate of .0011 on the average blue-collar travel-time variable. Ob- 
viously, the result is not consistent with a model in which the likelihood 
of  finding a job is  sharply  reduced when jobs are not located  very 
nearby. 
Perhaps even more important is the coefficient on PBLACK. With 
or without the inclusion of accessibility variables, the coefficient is .18. 
None of  the measures affects it in the slightest. These results show no 
evidence at all that black and white employment differences originate 
in job proximity. 
Table 4.6 summarizes the results of  all CATS-based measures  of 
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flat. But the import ratio and average travel-time measures are always 
of  the expected  sign and often significant. The best single measure 
appears to be the import ratio for all workers. Unfortunately though, 
the coefficients are all very small. Pushing up employment rates just 
one percentage point requires massive changes in the accessibility in- 
dices. These pale in comparison to the .18 point edge enjoyed by whites 
over blacks.  Moreover, these proximity measures are uniformly im- 
potent with respect to the PBLACK coefficient. None causes it even 
to flinch. 
Accessibility shows some minor effects here. But even these results 
may overstate the power of the variables. These coefficients are highly 
Table 4.6  Regression Results Showing Performance of Various Job 
Accessibility Measures Using 1970 Census Tract Data 
Coefficient on 
Job  Coefficient on  Accessibility  RZ 
Accessibility  Percent Black  Measure  (Standard Error 
Measure  (Standard Error)  (Standard Error)  of  Estimate) 
None 
% of All Jobs 
Within 30 Minutes’ 
Transit 
% of Blue-collar and 
Service Jobs Within 
30 Minutes’ Transit 
Import Ratio for 
All Workers 
Import Ratio for 
Blue-Collar and 
Service Workers 
Import Ratio for 
Teenagers 
Average Travel 
Time for All 
Workers 
Average Travel 




Time for Teenagers 
-.12 
(.08) 








-  .0009 
(.0005) 






















Source: 1970 Census Tract data (1973) and 1970 Chicago Area Transportation Study. 
Note: Other variables include percent Spanish-speaking, percent high school graduates, 
percent of  persons in tract over age 25, average family income, percent of persons in 
poor families, and percent of children in single-parent families. 174  David T.  Ellwood 
unstable.  Many more  are insignificant in  the male-only regressions. 
Other regressions using job-change data also fail to show any impact 
of accessibility. And the unweighted estimates are rarely significant. It 
is simply impossible to find strong effects with these variables. 
It is plausible that accessibility is a far more important factor in black 
than in white households. Informal job networks may provide whites 
with access to jobs over a larger geographic area. Blacks are not blessed 
with such extensive networks and may be more at the mercy of the 
neighborhood job situation. 
Table 4.7 provides results using tracts with greater than 50 percent 
blacks only. Several interesting results appear. The one of the most 
immediate concern is the recurrent failure of the proximity variables. 
Signs are often reversed, and none of the coefficients is  significant. 
Average travel time performs best here, but once again there are only 
small effects. The entire arsenal of  CATS-based variables are meek. 
Proximity as captured here explains little of the unemployment in pre- 
dominantly black tracts. 
There is another perhaps more telling finding, however, PBLACK 
was included because a few of the tracts had small white populations. 
Typically, these tracts span ghetto boundaries. The thought-provoking 
finding in table 4.7 is that the coefficient on PBLACK is almost as large 
as it is for all tracts. The only whites in this sample live in the ghetto 
or at its borders, yet tracts with more whites have better employment 
rates. This finding suggests that black-white differentials within neigh- 
borhoods are almost as high as differential for blacks and whites living 
across town, after we have controlled for income, schooling, and the 
like. If so, neighborhood differences cannot really explain the relatively 
poor  performances  of  young  blacks.  We  shall  return  to this  issue 
momentarily. 
We  have tried a wide array of job accessibility variables. Most have 
performed poorly. Although they usually have the expected sign, their 
magnitudes are typically very small and many are insignificant. At best, 
the magnitudes seem consistent with a model that suggests extra com- 
muting time reduces the real wage and thus reduces labor supply. Not 
a single one of them explains anything of the black-white differences. 
Surely, this performance offers little support for the hypothesis that a 
major reason why blacks perform poorly in the Chicago labor market 
is their  isolation in  neighborhoods  with  low job proximity.  We  are 
always confronted with the nagging problem, however, that we may 
simply have missed the true differences in accessibility across neigh- 
borhoods. It seems appropriate, therefore, to turn our focus to a more 
fundamental level to explore, namely, just how big the neighborhood 
effects of whatever origin are, once we have controlled for a few basic 
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Table 4.7  Regression Results for Tracts With 50% or More Blacks 
Coefficient on 
Job  Coefficient on  Accessibility  RZ 
Accessibility  Percent Black  Measure  (Standard Error 
Measure  (Standard Error)  (Standard Error)  of Estimate) 
None 
% of  all Jobs 
Within 30 Minutes’ 
Transit 
% of Blue-Collar and 
Service Jobs Within 
30 Minutes’ Transit 
Import Ratio for 
All Workers 
Import Ratio for 
Blue-Collar and 
Service Workers 
Import Ratio for 
Teenagers 
Average Travel 
Time for All 
Workers 
Average Travel 
Time for Blue- 
Collar and 
Service Workers 
Time for Teenagers 
Average Travel  * 




-  ,003 
(.ow 




-  ,0017 
(.0013) 
-  ,0017 
(.0013) 




















Source: 1970 Census Tract data and 1970 Chicago Area Transportation Study. 
Nore: Other variables are as listed in table 4.6. n. 
4.6.2  Fixed-Effects Models 
When employment rates by census tract are displayed on a map, we 
can observe sizable differences across neighborhoods. Knowing only 
a youngster’s neighborhood would help us greatly in making predictions 
about his or her likely employment status. But it would also aid us in 
predicting the youth’s race, education, and family income. We  would 
like to know whether significant neighborhood differences remain after 
having controlled for the usual list of socioeconomic variables. Indeed, 
we would most like to know whether the strength of such socioeco- 
nomic variables such as race or income can actually be traced to neigh- 
borhood effects that are correlated with these variables. 176  David T.  Ellwood 
We can explicitly allow for fixed neighborhood effects by providing 
each community zone with  its own intercept. These intercepts will 
control for all the differences between zones;  the only information that 
remains comes from differences in outcomes within community zones. 
When we examine the regression results for a fixed-effects model, we 
are exploring only the effects of particular independent variables within 
neighborhoods. 
The results of this experiment are astonishing.  The coefficient on 
PBLACK does not fall; it actually rises to .22.  There is only one possible 
inference: blacks and whites in the same community zone fare as dif- 
ferently as blacks and whites across town from each other. Remember, 
there are 76 community zones in  the city alone. Within these small 
areas there is a larger racial differential than between the zones. No 
wonder the proximity measures failed to influence the PBLACK coef- 
ficient. Perhaps this result should not have been a surprise. After all, 
even in  the predominatly  black  tracts of  the earlier  analyses, race 
seemed just as important as an explanatory variable. We can infer that 
no measure of  accessibility, however conceived, that is  defined  by 
community area will account for black-white differences. 
Perhaps the most remarkable  result  of all is that deriving from the 
traditional Fischer test for equality of coefficients, which can be used 
here to test whether the hypothesis of no neighborhood effects (equality 
of  intercepts) is  rejected  by  the data. The restriction  of  a  uniform 
intercept is not rejected. This result is extraordinary.  There are so many 
reasons to expect neighborhoods  to differ,  quite apart from accessi- 
bility, on the measured independent variable that we certainly would 
have expected the data to fail this test. We  find small neighborhood 
effects from whatever origin. 
Nonetheless, it is important not to overrepresent the power of this 
finding. The definition of neighborhood used here-community areas 
defined  in  the  1940s-may  not  conform  well  to current distinctions 
among neighborhoods. The fact that these neighborhoods jointly yield 
no significant effects does not mean  some other geographic configu- 
ration would not. Nor does the result imply that none of the individual 
neighborhood effects is significant-they  are only jointly impotent. Still, 
the total lack of impact on PBLACK and the visual and statistical failure 
of  neighborhood  effects  using  the city’s own designations  of neigh- 
borhoods cast serious doubt on the significance of the mismatch story. 
We  can restate the findings in another way. If a particular  youth’s 
level of schooling, family income, or race are unknown, knowing his 
or her neighborhood  will help in predicting how they will fare in the 
job market, but if we do  know these basic socioeconomic  facts, know- 
ing the location of their neighborhood will still not tell us very much. 
The 1970 employment-rate regressions are not at all supportive of a 
hypothesis blaming weak the labor market performance of blacks on 177  The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis 
their segregation into neighborhoods with weak labor demand. None 
of the job accessibility measures serves to support that claim. Even 
allowing for a great many fixed neighborhood effects, we were unable 
to reduce the PBLACK coefficient, after controlling for schooling and 
income. These tract data therefore cast serious doubt on the mismatch 
story. Individual  data from  the Census  Employment Survey (CES) 
controvert the hypothesis even more seriously. 
4.6.3  Comparisons of the South and West Sides 
According to the Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission the 11 
community zones within Chicago that lie south of the Loop provided 
fewer than  5  percent  of  the city’s jobs in  1970, whereas the  three 
community zones in  the West Side ghetto had more than three times 
as many jobs. Every single measure of proximity we defined also shows 
that the West Side has much better proximity to jobs than the South 
Side does. Indeed, the West Side typically offers among the best ac- 
cessibility levels, and the South Side the worst, in the entire SMSA. 
A  drive through the black ghettos of the West and South Sides is 
just as revealing. From almost any block in the West Side, large, mostly 
industrial smoke stacks can be seen. (Not all are still in operation.) 
Located right in the center of  the West Side, the international head- 
quarters of Sears could be found in 1970. The complex occupied several 
city blocks.  The company conducted office, warehousing, and sales 
functions all at that site. Sears moved its headquarters to the downtown 
Sears Tower in  1972, but  even today  Sears maintains  the site as a 
warehouse and distribution center. On the eastern half of the ghetto is 
a large complex of hospitals, which are traditionally a good source of 
low-skilled  jobs for service workers, such as cleaning, food preparation 
and distribution, and orderly services. On several borders and extend- 
ing into the ghetto are old industrial parks.  Brocks Candy, Westing- 
house, General Electric all have manufacturing plants in and around 
the area. The only smoke stacks on the South Side are those of schools 
and churches. The South offers only two sources of employment: small 
commercial establishments along a few streets and the University of 
Chicago. 
In short, the two ghetto areas present a marvelous natural experi- 
ment. For many reasons, the CES is ideal for our purposes.  It was 
conducted right after the  1970 Census. Separate surveys were con- 
ducted on the West and South Sides of Chicago. Blacks and whites in 
low-income neighborhoods  were  surveyed, and the survey was  de- 
signed particularly to gain labor market information. 
We  have already seen that measures of job accessibility explain little 
of the variation in employment rates for young people in entirely black 
census tracts. Since much of the variation in accessibility is between 
the West  and South Sides, we  have already  implicitly exploited the 178  David T.  Ellwood 
natural experiment and found little support.  The CES data allow a 
much more explicit test, offering a clear window through which to view 
the effects of  economic history. 
West and South Side data were drawn from low-income census tracts. 
Thus, the sampling technique corrects for the most important explan- 
atory variable besides race. It is very revealing simply to compare the 
average labor market outcomes in each area. Since we have excellent 
information on individuals, we can compare not only employment rates, 
but also unemployment patterns, school enrollment, occupational mix, 
wage rates, and journey-to-work  times between the two sides of Chicago. 
Table 4.8 shows unemployment rates, employment rates, educational 
attainment, and travel times for blacks in each ghetto area. The simi- 
larity in outcomes is remarkable. Half of the out-of-school youths in 
each ghetto had jobs in 1970. Two-fifths of those without a high school 
degree worked in each area, although the West Side does edge out the 
South ever so slightly. But these figures are based on only about 100 
observations in  each area. Standard errors for the employment  and 
unemployment rates are roughly five percentage points. In these fig- 
ures, the employment and unemployment rates never differ by more 
than three percentage points. And we would expect the reduced real 
wage on the South Side to induce small differences in labor supply. 
The picture here is one of equal depression on both sides of  the 
Loop. Fully half of the school dropouts in both areas reported  that 
they were interested in work but unable to find it. School attainment 
Table 4.8  Comparison of  Employment and Unemployment Rates, 
Educational Attainment, and Travel Times for Out-of-School 
Black Men Aged 16-21 in Very Low-Income Neighborhoods on 
the South and West Sides of Chicago, 1970. 
Ghetto Location 
Dependent Variable  South Side  West Side 
Unemployment Rate 
All 
High School Dropouts 
All 
High School Dropouts 
Educational Attainment 














.61  .66 
36 minutes  29 minutes 
35 minutes  25 minutes 
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differed slightly in the two areas (the differences are not statistically 
significant), but roughly two-thirds of the out-of-school youths aged 16 
to 21 were dropouts in  both places.  (This does not  imply that the 
dropout rate was 67 percent). The problems look severe, and they look 
equally severe in each area. 
Indeed, the only variable in the table that shows a marked difference 
between the two areas is travel time. Youths on the South Side spend 
25 percent more time getting to work. The differences are especially 
pronounced for dropouts. West Side dropouts spend 25 minutes com- 
muting to their jobs, while their South Side counterparts need 10 extra 
minutes to reach theirs. The earlier description of job proximity is again 
confirmed here. South Side residents must travel much farther to their 
jobs; they do, in fact, live farther away. 
Occupational patterns in the two areas also appear unusually similar, 
as shown in table 4.9. Even though sample sizes are quite small, nearly 
equal proportions of  young people in the two areas are working as 
managerial and professional workers, craftsmen, operators, transport 
workers, and laborers. Only the clerical and service occupations show 
some divergence. Sough Side workers more commonly work in clerical 
positions. A  chi-squared test comes nowhere near rejecting the hy- 
pothesis that the areas are identical. Finally, there is the matter of wage 
rates. South Side residents appear to have better rather than worse 
jobs by this yardstick. 
The differences in labor market outcomes are very small. Whether 
you travel south or west from the Chicago Loop, you will find similar 
employment  problems.  Considering the fact that  simple journey-to- 
work costs vary between the areas, it is all the more surprising that 
Table 4.9  Comparison of  Occupational Mix and Wage Rates for Youths 16- 
21 in Low-Income Neighborhoods on the South and West Sides of 
Chicago, 1970 
Ghetto Location 
Occupation  South Side  West Side 
























Average Wage Rate:  $2.92  $2.75 
~~  _____  ~ 
Source: Census Employment Survey, 1970. 180  David T.  Ellwood 
there are not at least some differences. In fact, there are some small 
effects. If we accept the point estimates, South Side residents do work 
a bit less (3  percentage points or 6 percent), attend school a little longer, 
and demand or command a slightly higher wage than West Side inhab- 
itants. The differences in proximity are slightly higher than we might 
have expected based on the real-wage effect of a 10-minute  longer travel 
time for South Side residents. Nevertheless, the results do not suggest 
that a major impact of job proximity on employment is indicated by 
the modest effect of transportation costs on the real wage. 
More sophisticated comparisons can also be performed. I have spec- 
ified human capital wage equations, conventional schooling equations, 
and labor-supply and unemployment models and estimated them sep- 
arately for each area. Because the sample sizes are small, the coeffi- 
cients tend to be somewhat unstable, but Fischer tests are rarely failed. 
When pooled  regressions  are run  that  include  a West  Side dummy 
variable, that variable is almost always insignificant, though it occa- 
sionally shows a slight edge for the West Side. After controlling for the 
conventional  labor  market  variables,  outcomes  remain  remarkably 
similar. 
We  have once again turned up virtually no evidence in support of 
the mismatch story. We  had what appeared to be the purest of natural 
experiments: measurablly identical populations in measurably different 
labor markets. The labor market results were not measurably different. 
4.6.4  Comparisons within the Same Neighborhood 
There is*  one natural experiment that offers even more compelling 
evidence. Fundamentally, the mismatch story is an attempt to explain 
racial patterns of employment by differences in residential locations. 
The cleanest experiment of all, then, is to compare employment pat- 
terns for different racial groups who live in  the same location. The 
CES once again provides the opportunity. 
Poor neighborhoods in the South Side are almost entirely black. But 
in the West and near-northwest live both blacks and whites. The West 
Side survey covered both whites and blacks living in close proximity. 
Table 4.10 shows the employment and unemployment rates of out- 
of-school men living in the surveyed low-income area. Once again, the 
data are quite startling. In each age group, considerably more whites 
than blacks have found work. Among young people the differences are 
particularly extreme. Nearly 80 percent of the out-of-school whites are 
working, whereas only just over 50 percent of comparable blacks are. 
Here in the West Side, the black youth unemployment rate is 35 percent, 
while whites suffer only 11 percent unemployment. 
The table also reveals that differences cannot be attributed to the 
level of  education.  In  the younger  cohorts, a greater proportion  of 181  The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis 
Table 4.10  Unemployment and Employment Rates for White and Black Out- 
of-School Men Living in Poor Neighborhoods on Chicago’s West 
Side by Age, 1970 







11.0%  7.6%  3.9%  4.3% 
35.1%  21.3%  11.5%  6.7% 
79.4%  88.8%  91.2%  77.1% 
54.3%  73.3%  78.9%  72.3% 
Percent High School Graduates 
Whites  29.4%  42.1%  33.3%  29.9% 
Blacks  33.7%  57.0%  3 1.3%  20.9% 
Source: Census Employment Survey, 1970. 
blacks than whites had graduated from high school. This result may 
reflect greater outmigration by better-educated whites. If so, the results 
are all the more compelling. Those whites who remain behind are likely 
to be the ones least effective in their job-search behavior. 
I have run regressions comparable to the census tract, employment 
rate equations for individuals in the CES. A simple OLS regression 
was run on a dichotomous employment-status variable (1 = employed). 
The coefficient on race (1 = black) was -  .20. Controlling for every- 
thing possible given the data, being black dampened employment pros- 
pects by 20 percentage points over whites in the same area. The -  .20 
coefficient is virtually identical to the .18 coefficient we found for black 
versus white tracts across the SMSA. Thus, the problem isn’t space. 
It’s race. 
And this result is verified by yet another source: a very recent survey 
conducted by Jon D. Miller for Chicago United, a socially active group 
of  prominent business people.  The survey was limited to a few low- 
income areas within the city. Teenagers, black and white, were sur- 
veyed in  each area. The results were again startling.  Using the U.S. 
Burear of  Labor Statistics (BLS) methodology, Miller found unem- 
ployment rates of 65 percent for black youth, 29 percent for Hispanics, 
and 13 percent for whites all living in low-income areas. Although the 
figures for blacks are surely higher than we would expect in a standard 
BLS survey, the differences between low-income black  youths and 
white youths in these neighborhoods are dramatic. 
Perhaps the strongest piece of evidence that race, not space, explains 
unemployment comes from looking at maps of employment rates and 
racial mix. A comparison of a map showing youth employment rates 182  David T.  Ellwood 
by census tract and one showing the percentage of the population who 
are black uncovers remarkable similarities.  lo Areas with low teenage 
employment rates and those with predominantly  black residents are 
almost perfectly congruent. For example, the area to the north of the 
eastern half of the West Side is predominantly poor white and Hispanic, 
and simply moving across a street to a black tract moves the unem- 
ployment rate from below 30  percent to over 60  percent. The same 
pattern appears at almost every border of the black areas. There is a 
black ribbon running from the West Side to an area just south of the 
Loop, and  there is an  identical  ribbon of  low  teenage  employment 
levels.  The teenage  employment  rates  are not  based  on  very  large 
samples, so we can expect considerable variability. That the employ- 
ment  rates and racial  composition  should be  so closely  matched  is 
therefore all the more surprising. Blacks and whites in similar economic 
circumstances in very similar locations fare very differently. 
It is no wonder that models with job accessibility measures and even 
fixed effects failed to budge the PBLACK coefficient. Where blacks 
live, employment rates are low. Across the street where whites reside, 
they are higher. No variable, however clever, can make  that result 
disappear. 
4.7  Conclusion 
We have explored in detail the spatial dimensions of one labor market. 
Low-skilled jobs in Chicago are moving to the suburbs faster than are 
low-skilled workers.  Young blacks  do spend longer getting to work 
than young whites do, considerably more.  And most workers, even 
young workers, work for outside any area that might reasonably be 
classified as a neighborhood.  Yet  all  of  the attempts here  to find  a 
substantial impact of job accessibility on labor market outcomes lead 
to the same conclusion: accessibility matters only slightly-about  as 
much as would be expected from a slightly lower real wage caused by 
extra commuting time. There is no evidence that any important part 
of the black-white differential in employment rates can be traced to 
differential residential  proximity to jobs. Black and white teenagers 
with comparable measured characteristics do just as differently when 
they live next to each other as when they live far apart in areas with 
dramatic differences in job accessibility. 
Based on these results it is possible to understand both the appeal 
of the mismatch story and its failure. Blacks are being gradually dis- 
advantaged by the movement  of jobs-at  least in  Chicago.  But the 
labor market is large enough geographically and fluid enough that these 
outward movements of jobs do not appear to cause substantial dis- 183  The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis 
advantages to those who remain behind, except that on average they 
must commute farther to work. 
The results here are only for one city, of course, though preliminary 
results from other cities suggest the results also apply elsewhere. And 
data from Chicago have been used by mismatch supporters in the past. 
Chicago has all the symptoms of the mismatch disease. The disease 
just does not seem to be the cause of the many labor market pains of 
black teenagers. 
Notes 
1. See also Offner and Saks (1971). 
2.  See especially Harrison (1972) and Harrison (1974). 
3.  See, for example,  Kain (1980) and Berry (1976). 
4. The theorem also requires  that production  functions  be homogeneous  of degree 
one and that the same sector always be more labor intensive than the other, regardless 
of the  ratio of the wage to land  rent. For  more than  two sectors, the  conditions  are 
considerably more complicated. 
5. There is considerable  debate over a possible inner-city land shortage. For  some 
discussion,  see Harrison (1974). 
6. The sample of some 20,000 workers in the metro area is unique in that it contains 
detailed information on residence and workplace locations for the individuals included. 
When calculating import ratios for the city by profession,  we find results very similar 
to those found in table 4.1, which are based on census data. 
7. Many authors have found that blacks have longer travel times. In every category 
in which they reported results for blacks,  Rees and Schultz (1970) showed far greater 
travel distances for black than for white workers in Chicago. Theirs was a nonrandom 
sample of firms, hbwever. Deskins (1972) found longer travel times for blacks in Detroit. 
Meyer, Kain, and Wohl (1965) uncovered racial differences in Chicago and Detriot, and 
Greytak (1974) argued that blacks and whites behave very differently. 
8.  See, for example, Beesley (1973) and Hensher (1976). 
9. See also Stevens (1978). Youthwork (1980), and Rosenfield (1977). 
10. These maps are available from the author. 
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Comment  Jonathan  S. Leonard 
David Ellwood has accomplished at least three very good things here. 
First, he has chosen an interesting question with  substantial policy 
implications.  Second, he has gone to great lengths to assemble new 
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and appropriate data to test the question. Third, he  has not rested 
content with one test on one set of data, but instead has carefully cross- 
checked his work with a variety of innovative tests on related data. It 
is unusual to find a paper that combines these three virtues.  In my 
opinion, Ellwood’s work is the best so far to address the mismatch 
hypothesis for youths, and his work will serve as a basis for further 
research. Given the clarity with which it poses questions and the quality 
of  its tests, the paper provides a useful base from which to discuss, 
first, the difficulties of empirically analyzing urban labor markets and, 
second, the puzzles and paradoxes posed by the mismatch hypothesis. 
In one of its forms, the mismatch hypothesis states that inner-city 
blacks, especially the young, suffer high unemployment in part because 
the jobs they  are suited for are far from the ghetto.  Moreover, this 
unemployment problem is expected to worsen as blue-collar jobs con- 
tinue to move to the suburbs, as residential segregation or inadequate 
transportation makes it difficult for blacks to follow the jobs. 
The key variable here is the number of available jobs. It would seem 
a simple and straightforward task to measure labor demand relative to 
supply. It is not. This task presents formidable theoretical and empirical 
challenges, not all of which have been overcome by Ellwood’s analysis. 
My criticisms of “The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis” primarily con- 
cern the direct tests of the impact  of job proximity  and availability 
displayed in table 4.5. First, I suspect all of the job availability measures 
used here are of  relatively low reliability because they are based on 
the Chicago Area Transportation Study. It is hard to tell how repre- 
sentative this sample of  about 20,000 workers is. Since the job avail- 
ability measures are defined for 116 zones, they are based on roughly 
172 workers per zone. Of  these  172, the number holding jobs that a 
teenager might hold must be smaller, so the analysis depends on data 
from small samples. Measurement error is likely to affect the dependent 
variable, too, since the percentage of out-of-school youths in a census 
tract probably numbers in the hundreds, or in the tens for a 5 percent 
sample.  Unfortunately, Ellwood had little or no alternative to using 
these data, and he is to be commended for his innovative use of them. 
Future researchers do have an alternative, however: the 1980 Census 
Urban Transportation Planning Package, a data set tailor-made to ex- 
tend the analysis of spatial questions, including the mismatch hypoth- 
esis, to most major urban areas in the United States. 
The inevitable data problems aside, we also face a theoretical prob- 
lem. How can we begin to think about the jobs available to the teenage 
black on the South Side of Chicago? Ellwood uses three measures of 
job availability, and as he notes, these average measures for the em- 
ployed may not indicate the experience of the marginal worker. Con- 
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First is the number of  nearby jobs, a count of jobs within, for ex- 
ample, 30 minutes of the residence. But as the author recognizes, what 
we need is a measure of demand relative to supply, and here arises the 
difficulty. One could imagine counting the number of competing work- 
ers living within the same 30-minute travel radius and calling this labor 
supply, but this measure could only be a flawed and rough approxi- 
mation. Consider the man living on the edge of that 30-minute circle: 
his  relevant labor demand would be given by  yet  another circle, a 
different market.  We  could  easily go from  coast to coast this way. 
Except for a limited class of monocentric distributions that quickly 
reach limits, this type of problem has largely been intractable so far. 
Ellwood proceeds  to two other availability measures in table 4.5. 
The import ratio is better than the preceeding measure, but it misses 
an element of choice. The logic behind this measure implies that be- 
cause the suburbs export workers, the employment-population ratio 
there must be low and the import ratio in the central city must be high. 
But if there is employment discrimination, many inner-city jobs may 
not be available to blacks. 
The third measure, travel time, again misses the issue of choice. In 
table 4.5, a higher average travel time is supposed to reflect the lack 
of  local jobs, so the mismatch  hypothesis predicts  that  zones with 
higher average travel times will have lower employment rates. But no 
one would expect, as this logic suggests, that zones of suburban whites 
with high travel times would have low employment rates. The same 
long commuting time that reflects choice on the part of suburban whites 
may also reflect the constraint of residential segregation affecting blacks. 
Although criticisms can be made of'each of  the availability measures 
used in the paper, it is far more difficult to recommend a better oper- 
ational alternative. 
One might also wish to see different specifications of the regressions 
in table 4.5, the only ones fully reported. For example, the proximity 
variables are defined only for groupings of the neighborhoods, but the 
regression  is run  on  1,132 tracts.  (What happened to the 400  other 
tracts?) This specification will tend to give high standard errors on the 
proximity measures, since they are held fixed across tracts within neigh- 
borhoods while the employment rate varies. 
As with any specification, one can argue that table 4.5 contains both 
too many variableb and too few. If proximity affects adults as well as 
teenagers, we can expect the family-income variable to pick up part 
of  the true effect of proximity. Interactions of the percentage black 
with the proximity and education measures might also be useful.  A 
comparison of tables 4.5 and 4.7 shows evidence of nonlinearity: the 
coefficient on the percentage black is smaller, and of marginal signifi- 
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The estimation of neighborhood effects may contain too many dummy 
variables, resulting in “fratricide,”  or econometric “dense pack.”  Should 
we really expect each of the neighborhoods outside the city, comprising 
one-half of the total, to differ from the other? 
But Ellwood’s conclusion does not rest on the regressions in table 
4.5 alone. The author also presents a creative array of “natural”  ex- 
periments, which taken together are quite compelling. Since most are 
based  on small samples, none are claimed  to be significant.  For ex- 
ample, the CES results based on roughly  100 observations per zone 
can at best be suggestive. 
The evidence from boundary neighborhoods, neighboring black and 
white districts, seems particularly telling, but one’s interpretation may 
again depend on the underlying possibilities for choice. The comparison 
may be of whites who have chosen to stay near their jobs and blacks 
of limited residential mobility. If residential segregation constrains blacks 
but not  whites,  the movement  of whites may  result  in  lower unem- 
ployment rates in white than in nearby black districts. If there is strong 
employment discrimination in addition,  proximity  need not  indicate 
availability. The job across the street might as well be on the moon as 
far as blacks are concerned. 
What then do we know about the mismatch hypothesis? Ellwood’s 
results  are not  unique.  Using a national  Current Population  Survey 
sample, Price and Mills (1983) reached a similar conclusion. They found 
that only 6 percent of the black-white earnings differential  could be 
explained  by  the greater concentration of blacks  in  the central city, 
whereas At  least 15 percent was due to employment discrimination. 
Adding support to this view is Meyer and Gomez-lbanez’s (1981) re- 
view of a number of studies of transit demonstration projects funded 
by  the federal government in  the aftermath of the 1965  Watts riots. 
These studies tested the hypothesis that improved bus service to out- 
lying  employment  centers would  reduce  inner-city  unemployment. 
Meyer and Gomez-Ibanez concluded  that “there was little evidence 
that many jobs were found because of the new bus service. . . . When 
compared with  racial  discrimination or lack of skills and education, 
employment decentralization  and inadequate or expensive public trans- 
portation appeared to be relatively minor causes of unemployment (or 
underemployment) among low-income central-city residents” 
The decentralization of jobs continues, and as it does inner-city em- 
ployment rates, particularly for blacks, continue to fall. The situation 
Ellwood describes has grown worse in Chicago since 1970. In my own 
study (1983) of Chicago and Los Angeles between 1974 and 1980, blue- 
collar jobs moved farther away from the ghetto in Chicago but the 
average employed black moved closer. Blue-collar  employment is in 
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the ghetto border, but the black employment share is also declining 
slightly outside the ghetto. 
For all the mobility that Ellwood observes, the best predictor of the 
black employment share at a given establishment is not an indicator 
of  employment discrimination, such as a Title VII suit, or of govern- 
ment pressure under affirmative action, but rather simply the distance 
from the ghetto. Ellwood finds that the average employed black com- 
mutes roughly 10 miles to work; but in establishments 10 miles from 
the ghetto, the proportion of black employees falls by half. And Chicago 
employment has not become more racially homogeneous across geo- 
graphic zones. In that city, the impact of distance from the ghetto on 
the black employment share increased during the late  1970s as jobs 
dispersed, and the distribution of black employment came to resemble 
more closely the distribution of black residence, as black employment 
collapsed in the direction of the ghetto. 
What happens to black employees when their jobs move to the sub- 
urbs? In a recent  sophisticated analysis, Kain and Zax (1983) found 
that when an integrated firm moved from the central city to the suburbs, 
black employees were significantly less likely to follow and keep their 
jobs. Similarly, working from a complex theoretical base, Straszheim 
(1980) uncovered a positive wage gradient, or lower wages in the central 
city, for black but not for white workers with low levels of education. 
He concluded that this is persuasive evidence in support of Kain’s view 
(1968) that residential segregation reduces employment opportunities 
for blacks. 
Taking these studies together, we are still left with a paradox. Spatial 
considerations can explain a good deal about where blacks work, but 
they have not yet been shown to explain whether blacks work. 
I commend Ellwood for his great efforts in framing the questions, 
for digging for data to answer them, and for pursuing a number of 
innovative tests.  His paper establishes a useful framework on which 
future work can build, in particular by extending his analysis to other 
cities and other times.  It  seems race is important in explaining em- 
ployment, even within  neighborhoods.  Now we  must discover why 
that is. 
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